Belief, to the JTB theorists, has propositional content. Gettier, perhaps unknowingly, capitalizes on this mistake. Gettier argued against that formulation by stating that if S is justified in believing P, infers Q from P, then S is justified in believing Q. In both Gettier cases, it is claimed that Q is true, S is purportedly justified in inferring and thus believing Q, but given the case specifics, no one would reasonably assert that S knows Q. Well, according to Gettier and completely unbeknownst to S, the other guy also had ten coins in his pocket, and got the job. So, in the first case, "the man" is equivalent to S, not the other guy.
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The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge What is knowledge? To provide such an analysis would be to lay out and explain each of the components of that concept. The thought is that the individual conceptual components will be individually necessary each one of them required and jointly sufficient all of them together enough for the concept under analysis.
First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court.
Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to know that it is.
A conceptual analysis can be rebutted by providing apparent instances of the concept that do not meet the analysis challenging the necessity of the analysis or by providing concepts that apparently conform to the analysis that are nonetheless not examples of the concept under analysis challenging the sufficiency of the analysis.
Smith and Jones have both applied for a job. The president of the company tells Smith that Jones, and not Smith, will get the job. Smith seems to have excellent evidence to believe that Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. From this, Smith infers, and subsequently believes, that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
However, unbeknownst to Smith, he too has ten coins in his pocket and further, a last-minute judgment changes the decision regarding who gets the job from Jones to Smith.
So it is true that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, since it is Smith, who has ten coins in his pocket, who will get the job. However, most of us are reluctant to attribute knowledge to Smith in this case. It seems that even though he has a justified true belief, Smith just got lucky that his belief is true.
If this is right, then Gettier has shown that justification, truth, and belief are insufficient for knowledge, and hence, that the traditional analysis is wrong. A Proposed Solution The widespread response to the Gettier Problem as it has come to be known has been to admit that justification, truth, and belief are individually necessary but jointly insufficient for knowledge and to propose some fourth condition on knowledge.
An initially popular proposal was to ban beliefs resulting from false premises from counting as knowledge. However, this response was quickly challenged by epistemologists like Roderick Chisholm, Alvin Goldman, and Carl Ginet. Consider this famous counter-example from Goldman to the new proposed analysis: You are driving through the country. It seems to you as though every so often, you pass a barn.
Do you know that the thing you point to is a barn? If this is right, then it shows that the no false beliefs fourth condition will not do the trick. Recognition of this fact has led many contemporary epistemologists to focus their efforts on an analysis of the concept of epistemic luck. If we can determine exactly what this sort of luck is, the thought goes, we can determine i what sorts of it are knowledge-destroying5 and ii how best to block these sorts of knowledge-destroying luck.
For example, you know that you are reading a word philosophy article, you know how to read, and you know-of your best friend or your partner. This essay and much of contemporary Anglo-American epistemology is concerned with propositional knowledge, knowledge-that, only. For the purposes of this essay, we can treat the terms as relevantly synonymous.
The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge What is knowledge? To provide such an analysis would be to lay out and explain each of the components of that concept. The thought is that the individual conceptual components will be individually necessary each one of them required and jointly sufficient all of them together enough for the concept under analysis. First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it.
Epistemic closure and skeptical arguments[ edit ] The epistemic closure principle typically takes the form of a modus ponens argument: S knows p. S knows that p entails q. Therefore, S knows q. This epistemic closure principle is central to many versions of skeptical arguments. A skeptical argument of this type will involve knowledge of some piece of widely accepted information to be knowledge, which will then be pointed out to entail knowledge of some skeptical scenario, such as the brain in a vat scenario or the Cartesian evil demon scenario. A skeptic might say, for example, that if you know that you have hands, then you know that you are not a handless brain in a vat because knowledge that you have hands implies that you know you are not handless, and if you know that you are not handless, then you know that you are not a handless brain in a vat.